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Patrick Holden (University of Plymouth) looks at whether regional
institutions like the EU, Mercosur and ASEAN have risen to the challenge
of the pandemic. Should they – could they – have done more?
The current crisis might have seemed an ideal time for regional
integration institutions to act. Given the spatial dimension of the virus and
its economic impact, cooperation between neighbouring states is more
important than ever, and regional institutions are made for this purpose.
They are ideally suited to taking a holistic approach, as they combine
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trade agreements with different forms of socio-economic and political
cooperation. Academics have often placed great hopes in regional-level
cooperation, which Katzenstein argues has a ‘Goldilocks’ quality; it
transcends the limitations of the nation state, but is more practical and
grounded than global multilateralism and hyper-globalisation. Yet when
the crisis hit, as outlined in my recent study for the United Nations
University, the trade response – outside of Europe at least – was
overwhelmingly state-led.
By regional integration here we do not mean simply regional trade
agreements such as the US-Canada-Mexico agreement of 2020. Regional
integration institutions refers to entities with a broader remit which, at
least in theory, recon gure the sovereignty of members via binding rules.
Of course the best known example is the EU, but there are a range of other
institutions, including the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common
Market of the South (Mercosur) and the East African Community (EAC).
These institutions are generally poorly understood, sometimes overhyped
– popping up in the business media as the ‘South American EU’, or the
‘West African EU’, and so forth – but more often ignored.
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Mercosur  ags. Photo: Ministerios de Cultura de la Argentina via a CC-BY-
SA 2.0 licence
All of these organisations are distinct, rooted in their own regional politics,
and one must beware of holding them to some inappropriate ‘standard’ of
integration. Nevertheless most of these arrangements include customs
unions (ASEAN does not, though it has internal free trade agreements) as
well as strong aspirations for economic cooperation and unity in general,
so it is worth evaluating how they responded to the crisis. The WTO and
International Trade Centre databases of trade actions provide sources for
monitoring what happened during the initial stage of the crisis.
For obvious reasons, the pandemic has had a massive, negative impact on
trade. However, if we look at the actual trade policy measures taken by
states, we see that apart from export restrictions on scarce
medical/health related products, many of these were actually liberalising
(facilitating the import of said products). In the  rst  ve months of 2020,
285 measures were noted by the International Trade Centre: 151 were
restrictive, but 134 were liberalising.
The role of regional institutions (outside of Europe) in these trade
measures was not prominent. In social science terms their ‘agency’ was
not strong, in that the concrete actions were generally taken by their
individual member states (and applied to fellow regional member states
as well as the outside world), not the region as a unit. Figure 1 shows the
list of temporary measures taken by the Mercosur member states in the
 rst  ve months. Mercosur is regarded as having had a particularly bad
crisis, as it came on top of tensions between Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil and
its neighbours (particularly over free trade, as Bolsonaro has a bullish
approach to free trade while Argentina is much more cautious).
Discussions on developing a common policy on imports of medical
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equipment did not develop, and member states took a range of bilateral
actions on the issue.
Figure 1: Mercosur: trade measures from 1 February to 31 May 2020
 
Country Liberalising measures Restrictive measures
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Country Liberalising measures Restrictive measures
Argentina 5: including tariff reductions, suspension of
anti-dumping measures and VAT waivers for
health related products.
1: export licensing for
medical ventilators
Brazil 4: including tariff reductions, suspension of
import licensing requirements and other
control measures, suspension of anti-







Paraguay 2: changes in VAT for some health-related
products, tariff reduction for others
1: export licensing
requirement for PPE
Uruguay 1: tariff elimination for some health-related
products
0
ASEAN has fewer pretensions to being an integrated region than
Mercosur. Its members committed themselves to a uni ed approach while
individually implementing their own trade controls. One of the most
important of these was Vietnam’s temporary export restrictions on rice,
which had important food security implications for its neighbours (as well
as many other countries, it being a major supplier) but these were lifted in
the summer.
The two African institutions covered displayed a similar dynamic of
regional commitments but state-led actions on trade. More important than
these trade policy measures was the actual effect of the pandemic on
food production and supplies in particular. As elsewhere, the crisis could
exacerbate ongoing tensions between neighbouring states, exempli ed by
the temporary trucking dispute that  ared up between Kenya and Tanzania
in East Africa in May.
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Map of ECOWAS
Neither was there regional level agency in terms of signi cant economic
interventions by regional organisations, most regional organisations lack
the capacity for this (again, the exception is the EU which agreed a new
€750 billion recovery fund on top of its budget). Furthermore, there is little
evidence that regional institutions had signi cant in uence on the shape
of the socio-economic restrictions and interventions taken at the national
level.
Does this mean that the regional institutions were effectively irrelevant, or
even useless? This would go too far. The institutions did meet, and
secured commitments from the leaders of their member states to
maintaining vital trade and transport routes, while coordinating or at least
informing each other of other activities. Institutional secretariats
produced worthy coordination plans and strategies, such as this one by
the East African Community. Obviously, in the trade sphere the unilateral
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actions taken broke these commitments, but the actual trade measures
taken were modest (temporary and mostly focused on speci c health
related products). The regional institutions in question may have helped
prevent a much more fractious response to the crisis. That is the
counterfactual that we cannot know.
Looking at the broader impact of the crisis on economic globalisation the
language of some of the regional institutions is signi cant. Talk of the
regionalisation of supply chains as opposed to global supply chains
abounded. For example, ASEAN declared an aim to ‘strengthen regional
supply chains’. As of yet there are no concrete ideas as to how this would
be achieved. Certainly the fear (or hope) that regional organisations might
evolve into protectionist blocs has been unfounded: rhey are simply not
uni ed enough to go down this path, even if there were a political will to
do so.
The one institution that did demonstrate a temporary dynamic of
regionalisation versus globalisation was the EU, which persuaded member
states to remove export restrictions to each other partly by putting
temporary controls on exports beyond the Union. These were ended on 26
May 2020, and the Commission was quick to disavow any notion of
‘fortress Europe’, aspiring instead to ‘open strategic autonomy’, which
means providing economic security through diverse supply chains and
smart stockpiling rather than autarchy.
Of course the COVID-19 economic crisis has only just begun, so the role of
regional integration institutions could well develop. As we enter a post
neoliberal world (the crisis has surely swept away the last vestiges of
simplistic beliefs in a small state and the free market), the response to the
crisis will necessitate more state interventions. These will inevitably affect
neighbouring trade partners and thus the need for coordination, if not
negotiation, will grow. The regional institutions are tailor-made to facilitate
19/01/2021 Regional institutions and the pandemic | LSE COVID-19
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/12/15/how-did-regional-institutions-like-mercosur-asean-and-the-eu-respond-to-the-pandemic/ 8/11
this. Similarly, the new salience of links between health and economic
policy should give rise to creative interventions at the regional level:
perhaps regional integration can move beyond a reliance on trade
liberalisation. There may even be increased public support for practical,
functional, transnational cooperation on health and environmental
protection, as long as the bene ts are clearly apparent.
This post represents the views of the author and not those of the COVID-
19 blog, nor LSE.
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